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Objective: The aim of this study was to evaluate the influence of practice and training on fine-motor 21 
flying skills during a manual ILS approach.  22 
Background: There is an ongoing debate that manual flying skills of long-haul crews suffer from a lack 23 
of flight practice due to conducting only a few flights per month and the intensive use of automation. 24 
However, objective evidence is rare.  25 
Method: 126 randomly selected airline pilots had to perform a manual flight scenario with a raw data 26 
precision approach. Pilots were assigned to four equal groups according to their level of practice and 27 
training, by Fleet (short-haul, long-haul) and Rank (first officer, captain).  28 
Results: Average ILS deviation scores differed significantly in relation to the group assignments. The 29 
strongest predictor variable was fleet, indicating degraded performance among long-haul pilots.  30 
Conclusion: Manual flying skills are subject to erosion due to a lack of practice on long-haul fleets: all 31 
results support the conclusion that recent flight practice is a significantly stronger predictor for fine-32 
motor flying performance than the time period since flight school or even the total or type-specific 33 
flight experience.  34 
Application: Long-haul crews have to be supported in a timely manner by adequate training tailored 35 
to address manual skills or by operational provisions like mixed-fleet flying or more frequent 36 
transitions between short-haul and long-haul operation. 37 
Keywords: skilled performance, automation, perceptual-motor performance, manual controls, 38 
information processing 39 
40 
Haslbeck, A. & Hoermann, H.-J. (2016). Flying the needles: Flight deck automation erodes fine-motor flying skills among airline pilots. 
Human Factors: The Journal of the Human Factors and Ergonomics Society, 58(4), 533-545. 
 
3 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Sage Publishing in Human Factors on 13 Apr 2016, 
available online:http://hfs.sagepub.com/cgi/pmidlookup?view=long&pmid=27076096. 
 In his classical book about pilots’ stick and rudder skills Wolfgang Langewiesche (1944) explained 41 
that for learning the art of flying an aircraft the pilot sometimes needs to withstand his or her natural 42 
responses. For example, in a stall situation at low altitude the correct recovery requires to push the 43 
stick forward and to point the aircraft’s nose to the ground. A very strong skill is required to hold 44 
back powerful instinctive behaviors of pulling the stick backwards in this situation. Hard and 45 
continuous drill is indispensable for pilots to acquire and maintain the adequate touch and feel which 46 
is essential to manually control the aircraft in any conceivable maneuver. However, in todays 47 
advanced technology aircraft pilots are often lacking sufficient opportunities to practice when they 48 
are relieved too often from manual flying tasks by using automated systems (cf. SKYbrary, 2016a).  49 
Manual control implies lateral (roll, heading), vertical (pitch, altitude, vertical speed), and 50 
longitudinal (airspeed) control of an aircraft (Puentes, 2011) mainly through adequate fine-motor 51 
inputs by the human pilot to a control yoke (Boeing types) or a sidestick (Airbus types) governing an 52 
aircraft’s pitch and roll, and the thrust levers. Yaw control by rudder pedals is a minor task performed 53 
in normal operation only momentarily during takeoff, the landing flare, and the deceleration after 54 
touch down. In other words, manual control means hand flying by reference to raw data without 55 
highly automated systems like flight director, autopilot, autothrust, or other flight management 56 
systems (SKYbrary, 2016a). Raw data flying specifies the absence of the flight director (Casner, 57 
Geven, Recker, & Schooler, 2014). Under this basic but challenging condition the pilot performs a 58 
compensatory tracking task and in parallel cognitively processes information about speed, altitude, 59 
and the flightpath. This task requires adequate knowledge and skills to control the dynamics of the 60 
aircraft to actively follow the intended trajectory. In addition the localizer and glideslope indicators 61 
are amongst the most important information in the case of an instrument landing. For Airbus aircraft, 62 
manual flying is still supported by envelope protections in normal law mode.  63 
Previous Work investigating Pilots’ Manual Flying Skills 64 
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Increased flight deck automation could reduce the opportunity for flight deck crews to practice their 65 
manual flying skills, and therefore, could degrade their levels of performance. Early warnings were 66 
raised by Wiener and Curry (1980) even prior to having broader data-sets to examine this anticipated 67 
threat. Childs and Spears (1986) addressed perceptual and cognitive aspects of manual flying and its 68 
degradation, while Sarter and Woods (1994) reported few deficits in pilots’ proficiency in standard 69 
tasks like aborting a takeoff or disengaging the approach mode. Veillette (1995) showed a significant 70 
influence of automation on manual flying skills. More recent experimental studies were performed 71 
by Gillen (2008), showing that pilots performed below licensing standards, and Ebbatson (2009) 72 
evaluated the effect of degradation on manual skills due to a lack of opportunities to practice among 73 
short-haul crews. In one of the latest studies, Casner et al. (2014) observed pilots having difficulties in 74 
cognitive tasks corresponding to manual flight. Quite recently though, aviation regulatory authorities 75 
have raised common concerns about the deterioration of basic manual flying skills among pilots 76 
flying highly automated aircraft and recommended some preventive actions (Federal Aviation 77 
Administration, 2013a; European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013; Civil Aviation Authority, 2014). On 78 
one side, there is a high level of agreement among pilot and training communities as well as 79 
manufacturers that manual and cognitive flying skills tend to decline because of a lack of practice due 80 
to increased use of automated systems. On the other side, as Civil Aviation Authority (2014, p150) 81 
criticizes, scientific findings are still inconclusive as to which degree such decline occurs because 82 
evidence is often based on pilots’ opinions and experiences or an analysis of narratives.  83 
Evidence from Accident Statistics  84 
With respect to long-haul crews there is only anecdotal evidence that they suffer from an absence of 85 
practice opportunities, resulting in lower manual skills (Drappier, 2008; Learmount, 2011; Civil 86 
Aviation Authority, 2014). Aviation accidents with clear indications of a lack of manual flying skills, 87 
like the prominent Air France flight 447 (Bureau d’Enquêtes et d’Analyses pour la sécurité de 88 
l’aviation civile, 2012) and Asiana Airlines flight 218 (National Transportation Safety Board, 2014), are 89 
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too rare to provide statistical evidence. Dismukes, Berman, and Loukopoulos (2007) analyzed 19 90 
predominantly short-haul aviation accidents in the U.S. and found in eight cases clear evidence for 91 
insufficient manual flying skills at least as a contributing factor. Lacking manual skills are also involved 92 
in many upset and loss-of-control accidents (Lambregts, Nesemeier, Wilborn, & Newman, 2008; 93 
Newman, 2012). The International Air Transport Association (IATA) published 2015 an in-depth 94 
analysis of 415 accidents in commercial aviation, which occurred worldwide between 2010 and 2014. 95 
In 26% of these accidents (mostly landing accidents, but also loss of control in flight) IATA found 96 
tangible evidence that manual handling flight crew errors were involved (p.29). As one of the 97 
recommendations to operators IATA concludes that “Stable approaches are the first defense against 98 
runway excursions. The final, more important, defense is landing in the touchdown zone” 99 
(International Air Transport Association, 2015, p.77).  100 
Degradation of Fine-Motor Flying Skills 101 
While manual flying could be considered a rather simple tracking task in theory, pilots need regular 102 
practice and training to maintain this distinct set of fine-motor skills. Short-haul and long-haul 103 
operations support the maintenance of manual flying skills differently: for the former, eight to twelve 104 
duty cycles per month with up to four legs each is typical and for the latter, three to four long-range 105 
flights are performed monthly due to legal rest periods. Thus, both types of operation lead to 106 
different levels of practice in pilots’ manual skills. None of the abovementioned studies directly 107 
addressed the influence of practice and training on fine-motor skills. Based on the reviewed 108 
literature, we identified a research gap concerning a valid, holistic, and comparative evaluation of 109 
pilots’ manual flight proficiency: (1) regarding different types of operations – long-haul and short-110 
haul, (2) different levels of experience, responsibility, and tasks – captain (CPT) and first officer (FO), 111 
(3) under the recent amount of exposure to automation in today’s advanced technology aircraft, and 112 
(4) in a realistic flying scenario familiar to the pilots. In our work we are dealing with pilots who have 113 
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different levels of practice, training, and experience while facing the same flying tasks within identical 114 
limits of licensing standards (European Union, 2011).  115 
Research Questions and Hypotheses 116 
The main research question of this paper is: what influence does the level of practice and training 117 
have on fine-motor flying skills? The level of practice and training is not a single and measurable 118 
metric or unit, but rather a concept concerning flight proficiency that includes several influences: (1) 119 
elapsed time since initial flight training, addressing the long-term skill degradation (c.f. Ebbatson, 120 
2009; Franks, Hay, & Mavin, 2014); (2) daily flight practice, addressing on-the-job training (Fleishman, 121 
1966; Savion-Lemieux & Penhune, 2005); and (3) the influence of flight simulator sessions, when 122 
periodically selected flying tasks and maneuvers are to be practiced (recurrent training) and tested 123 
(proficiency checks) under the supervision of trainers and examiners (Buckley & Caple, 2009). It was 124 
hypothesized that with a higher level of practice and training, pilots show better fine-motor flight 125 
performance (Haslbeck, Kirchner, Schubert, & Bengler, 2014). Referring to the level of practice and 126 
training, a secondary research question arises: whether the time dated back to flight school and 127 
expertise (determined by Rank) or the daily flight practice (determined by Fleet) has a stronger 128 
influence on manual flight proficiency. If the former aspect prevails, first officers would perform 129 
better, because their elapsed time since flight school is shorter; in the latter case, short-haul crews 130 
would perform better, because they have more daily flight practice. Ebbatson (2009) and Franks et 131 
al. (2014) have argued that (initial) training long ago cannot sufficiently support recent manual flying 132 
skills. Addressing these research questions, we expect to see a stronger effect from the daily flight 133 
practice and a slightly weaker effect from the time period since flight school, which consequently 134 
leads to the expected order of manual flight performance: FO short-haul > CPT short-haul > FO long-135 
haul > CPT long-haul.        136 
METHOD 137 
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This paper reports on the analysis of the fine-motor flight performance of airline pilots derived from 138 
two consecutive flight simulator studies. Both studies were funded by a German research program in 139 
cooperation with a major European airline. Experiment A took place in 2011, comparing manual 140 
flight performance of two groups of pilots: FOs scheduled on short-haul service, representing a high 141 
level of practice and training, as well as CPTs scheduled for long-haul operation, representing a low 142 
level of practice and training. To complement experiment A with the two missing groups (i.e. CPTs on 143 
short-haul and FOs on long-haul), experiment B was conducted in 2013 with CPTs scheduled for 144 
short-haul service and FOs scheduled for long-haul service.  145 
Apparatus 146 
Airbus types were selected for two reasons: first, the fly-by-wire technology designed under the 147 
commonality principle (Vadrot & Aubry, 1994) ensures very similar handling characteristics and 148 
second, being equipped with second generation electrical flight control systems they expose pilots to 149 
high levels of automation (Brière and Traverse, 1993). Thus, we conducted both experiments in a 150 
southern German flight simulator training center equipped with two Airbus-type full-flight simulators 151 
(FFS Level D): one Airbus A320 device and another one in an Airbus A340-600 configuration.   152 
Scenario and Instruction  153 
Prior to both experiments, all participants completed another simulated flight scenario concerning 154 
operational problems (35 min) and simultaneously warmed up for the manual flying task. The flight 155 
scenario (10 min) for our study was a manual approach to Munich Airport (26R EDDM) and was the 156 
same for all participants. It started shortly before a defect in the autopilot and the flight director 157 
occurred; thus, lateral and vertical control of the aircraft in an instrument landing system (ILS) 158 
approach had to be performed manually based on raw data. Pilots were, however, allowed to use 159 
autothrust for the longitudinal control, but very few did; auto-trim was engaged. The weather was 160 
set to the following parameters: visibility 1,200 m, wind 220°/17-22 kts gusty, ceiling 270 ft, light rain. 161 
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All pilots were instructed to perform a landing as accurately as possible according to company 162 
standard operating procedures and ATP licensing standards. Participants had the role of pilot flying 163 
(PF) and were supported by a pilot monitoring who was either a confederate pilot (experiment A) or 164 
the second participating crewmember (experiment B).   165 
Participants 166 
All participants were randomly selected by the crew scheduling department of the cooperating 167 
airline, and occupied the same seat as well as the same aircraft type for which they were rated. Four 168 
groups (stratified random sample) of ATP licensed airline pilots, about 30 pilots per group, were 169 
scheduled as the PF in this experiment: FOs and CPTs on Airbus A320 as well as Airbus A340. All 170 
participating pilots experience routinely four annual 4-hours flight simulator training sessions: two 171 
recurrent training sessions and two legal licensing checks. Table 1 shows relevant demographical 172 
data for the 126 participants. The overall flight hours are a general measure of flying experience. 173 
Landings within the last 30 days prior to the experiment account for short-term practice, and time 174 
period since flight school indicates long-term skill retention.   175 
Table 1: Demographic data for participants 176 
Rank Fleet N Age Flight hours: overall/on type Landings in past 30 days Years since flight school 
mean SD mean SD mean SD mean SD 
FO A320 39 30.1 2.8 3,438/2,415 1,848/1,266 16.1 6.3 5.8 2.8 
FO A340 28 36.4 3.3 7,204/3,469 1,987/1,812 2.4 1.5 12.2 2.9 
CPT A320 30 43.0 4.3 11,276/3,847 1,931/2,355 16.6 10.2 18.1 3.3 
CPT A340 29 49.8 3.6 14,969/2,909 2,951/1,818 3.5 2.1 24.4 4.1 
Note. ILS deviation data evaluation is based on these 126 participants; TD points were calculated for these and 177 
four more CPTs on A340. 178 
Dependent Measures 179 
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Deviations from ideal flight performance and landing parameters (cf. International Air Transport 180 
Association, 2015, p77) were recorded and analyzed. ILS flightpath deflections were recorded in two 181 
different dimensions: for horizontal deviations from the localizer (LOC), and for vertical deviations 182 
from the 3°-glideslope (GS), maximum values were considered and the root mean square errors 183 
(RMSE) were calculated. The latter is a frequently used measure for fine-motor flight performance 184 
evaluations (Rantanen, Johnson, & Talleur, 2004; McClernon, Miller, & Christensen, 2012), even if it 185 
does not deliver the position information (Hubbard, 1987), which is of no interest for this study. 186 
Flight crew licensing standards require adhering deflections no larger than one dot for precision 187 
approaches (European Union, 2011). This unit corresponds to a deviation of ± 0.8° on the LOC and ± 188 
0.4° on the GS for Airbus types and is indicated on two scales in the primary flight display. These 189 
flightpath deviations were measured for three different altitude segments. The upper segment, 190 
3,000-1,000 ft above ground level (AGL), represents the initial instrument approach phase with 191 
medium difficulty, preparing the stabilized approach (SKYbrary, 2016b). The next segment, 1,000-192 
270 ft AGL, stands for the increasingly demanding instrument approach phase within the limits for a 193 
stabilized approach, not exceeding deviations larger than one dot. The last segment, 270-50 ft AGL, 194 
represents the transition to the visual approach shortly before the landing flare. Apparently, GS data 195 
becomes somewhat unreliable in the last segment because some pilots seem to have commenced 196 
the flare above 50 ft AGL. The datasets were only analyzed if the participant had completely finished 197 
the approach without aborting it. A further measure for manual flight performance with high 198 
practical relevance is the first point of touching down (TD) upon landing. We measured these TD 199 
points in two dimensions: absolute longitudinal distances to the threshold of the runway and 200 
absolute lateral distances to the centerline. The ideal TD point is the boldly marked aiming point 201 
located about 400 m (1,312 ft) behind the threshold. For this evaluation all datasets were included 202 
where the aircraft touched down, with or without a preceding go-around. 203 
RESULTS 204 
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All effects will be reported as significant at p < .05 and ηp2 is given as effect size. If the assumption of 205 
sphericity is violated, Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity are reported by ε. The mean values 206 
of all groups are presented in Table 2 for both measures: the flightpath deviations and the 207 
touchdown points.  208 
Table 2: Results of pilot groups for ILS flightpath and touchdown point deviations 209 
 RMSE ILS flightpath deviations [dot] TD point deviations [m] 
 3,000-1,000 ft AGL 1,000-270 ft AGL 270-50 ft AGL 
LONG LAT 
 LOC GS LOC GS LOC GS 
Group M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD M SD 
FO A320 .10 .04 .14 .05 .12 .06 .19 .08 .14 .08 .74 .55 418 115 2.0 1.5 
FO A340 .20 .08 .25 .10 .25 .14 .30 .13 .23 .18 .88 .67 501 133 2.1 2.0 
CPT A320 .11 .04 .13 .06 .14 .06 .17 .07 .18 .12 .58 .28 428 104 1.2 1.1 
CPT A340 .31 .22 .38 .20 .26 .10 .38 .18 .25 .11 1.2 .72 510 182 5.3 5.0 
Deviations from Localizer and Glideslope 210 
The maximum deviations on localizer (Figure 1) and glideslope (Figure 2) in the segment between 211 
1,000 and 270 ft AGL indicate that ten (18%) out of 57 approaches (all on A340) exceeded with at 212 
least one flight parameter the limits of a stabilized approach or of the licensing standards of a 213 
precision approach. 214 
 215 
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Figure 1: Individual maximum flightpath deviations on localizer. Dotted lines indicate limits not to be exceeded for 216 
stabilized approach and license checks. 217 
 218 
Figure 2: Individual maximum flightpath deviations on glideslope. Dotted lines indicate limits not to be exceeded for a 219 
stabilized approach and license checks. Values larger than ± 1.4 dot are depicted by numbers. 220 
All individual flightpath deviations averaged by the RMSE in the most relevant segment between 221 
1,000 and 270 ft AGL are displayed in Figure 3. These flight performance data were analyzed with a 222 
2 × 2 × 3 (between-subjects Fleet [A320, A340] × between-subjects Rank [FO, CPT] × within-subjects 223 
Altitude [3,000-1,000, 1,000-270, 270-50]) multivariate analysis of variance with two dependent 224 
variables: deviations on localizer (LOC) and glideslope (GS). In most cases RMSE and absolute 225 
deviation scores are not normally distributed, but positively skewed. For that reason all flightpath 226 
deviation data have been log-transformed for the further statistical analysis. The results of ILS 227 
deviations, which contain in a number of significant between- and within-subjects effects, are 228 
depicted in Table 3. Average differences between groups are visualized in Figure 4 and Figure 5. 229 
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 230 
Figure 3: RMSE of all individual flightpath deviations on localizer (upper half) and glideslope (lower half). Values larger 231 
than ± 0.6 dot are depicted by numbers.  232 
Table 3: Statistical analysis of log-transformed ILS flightpath deviations 233 
Source Multivariate Tests Univariate Tests 
between-subjects   
Fleet V = .45, F(2, 121) = 48.90, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .45 
LOC: F(1, 122) = 76.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = .39  
GS: F(1, 122) = 75.77, p < .001, ηp
2 = .38 
Rank V = .08, F(2, 121) = 5.50, 
p = .005, ηp
2 = .08 
LOC: F(1, 122) = 11.09, p = .001, ηp
2 = .08  
GS: F(1, 122) = 3.24, p = .074, ηp
2 = .03, n.s. 
Fleet * Rank V = .09, F(2, 121) = 5.60, 
p = .005, ηp
2 = .08 
LOC: F(1, 122) = .20, p = .655, ηp
2 = .00, n.s.  
GS: F(1, 122) = 9.20, p = .003, ηp
2 = .07 
within-subjects   
Altitude V = .80, F(4, 119) = 118.53, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .80 
LOC: ε = .87, F(1.75, 213.18) = 1.78, p = .175, ηp
2 = .01, n.s.  
GS: ε = .88, F(1.76, 215.03) = 318.66, p < .001, ηp
2 = .72 
Altitude * Fleet V = .14, F(4, 119) = 4.73, 
p = .001, ηp
2 = .14 
LOC: ε = .87, F(1.75, 213.18) = 8.00, p = .001, ηp
2 = .06.  
GS: ε = .88, F(1.76, 215.03) = 7.00, p = .002, ηp
2 = .05 
Altitude * Rank V = .02, F(4, 119) = .70, 
p = .595, ηp
2 = .02, n.s. 
 
Altitude * Fleet * Rank V = .03, F(4, 119) = .81, 
p = .524, ηp
2 = .03, n.s. 
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Note. These analyses are based on log10-transformed flightpath deviation data. The assumption of normality 234 
was violated for only one out of 24 datasets: glideslope, 3,000-1,000 ft AGL, CPTs on A320. The assumption of 235 
equality of covariance matrices and error variances was violated; however, by having only two dependent 236 
variables, we assume this violation as minor (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 252). For multivariate tests, Pillai’s 237 
statistic was reported. When the assumption of sphericity was violated (within-subjects tests), degrees of 238 
freedom were corrected using Greenhouse-Geisser estimates of sphericity (ε). The assumption of equality of 239 
error variances was violated for one out of six datasets: localizer, 270-50 ft AGL. 240 
 241 
Figure 4: Visualization of localizer deviations based on non-transformed data indicating Bonferroni post hoc comparisons 242 
based on log-transformed data.  243 
 244 
Figure 5: Visualization of glideslope deviations based on non-transformed data indicating Bonferroni post hoc 245 
comparisons based on log-transformed data. Values larger than 0.6 dot are depicted by numbers. 246 
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Analysis of Touchdown Points 247 
A two-way MANOVA was conducted, including the aforementioned factors Fleet and Rank, and two 248 
dependent variables: longitudinal (LONG) and lateral (LAT) absolute distance to the threshold and to 249 
the centerline of the runway, respectively. Furthermore, Pillai’s trace was chosen as a rather robust 250 
multivariate test statistic showing significant differences between groups. Statistical analysis of TD 251 
points is given by Table 4, and differences between groups are illustrated in Figure 6. 252 
Table 4: Statistical analysis of TD-point deviations 253 
Source Multivariate Tests Univariate Tests 
Fleet V = .18, F(2, 125) = 13.43, 
p < .001, ηp
2 = .18 
LONG: F(1, 126) = 11.67, p = .001, ηp
2 = .09  
LAT: F(1, 122) = 17.25, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12 
Rank V = .04, F(2, 121) = 2.54, 
p = .083, ηp
2 = .04, n.s. 
°LONG: F(1, 126) = .15, p = .699, ηp2 = .00, n.s.  
°LAT: F(1, 126) = 5.06, p = .026, ηp2 = .04 
Fleet * Rank V = .11, F(2, 125) = 7.90, 
p = .001, ηp
2 = .11 
LONG: F(1, 126) = .00, p = .980, ηp
2 = .00, n.s.  
LAT: F(1, 126) = 15.84, p < .001, ηp
2 = .11 
Note. For multivariate tests, Pillai’s statistic was reported. The assumption of equality of covariance matrices 254 
and error variances was violated. °For the factor Rank, only a statistical trend was found in the multivariate 255 
test. Univariate results are reported to complete the picture (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007, p. 269). 256 
 257 
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Figure 6: TD-point deviations indicating univariate test results.  258 
Effect of Age and Time Since Initial Training 259 
As shown in Table 1, the between-subjects effects of Rank and Fleet are correlated with the elapsed 260 
time since initial training and also with age. Based on the assumption that basic flight training is 261 
essential for building manual flying skills and that these skills are prone to decay without regular 262 
practice in advanced-technology aircraft, the reported significant effects of Fleet and Rank could be 263 
confounded with differences in time since initial flight training or with age. In order to rule out the 264 
possibility that we simply found time-related effects, we included age and time since flight training as 265 
covariates in separate MANCOVAs, corresponding to the abovementioned MANOVAs in Table 3 and 266 
Table 4. In fact, age and time since flight training are intercorrelated, rs = .95, p (one-tailed) < .001. 267 
Consequently the results are almost identical, and we only report the findings for the covariate time 268 
since initial training.  269 
In the MANCOVA of the ILS deviations, with time since initial training as a covariate, only two 270 
between-subjects effects are significant. While the effect for Rank disappears, Fleet (V = .31, F(2, 271 
120) = 26.72, p < .001, ηp2 = .31) and Fleet * Rank (V = .09, F(2, 120) = 5.98, p = .003, ηp2 = .09) are 272 
significant. The effect of time since initial training itself is not significant. The findings for the TD-273 
point deviations are similar. Time since initial training has no significant direct effect on the absolute 274 
deviation scores, and Rank is also not a significant between-subjects factor. Nevertheless, the 275 
differences between long-haul and short-haul pilots are still statistically significant (V = .08, F(2, 276 
123) = 5.13,  p = .007, ηp2 = .08) as well as the Fleet * Rank (V = .11, F(2, 123) = 7.71, p = .001, 277 
ηp
2 = .11) interaction. Through these MANCOVAs we can provide evidence that the differences in 278 
flying performance between long-haul and short-haul pilots cannot be interpreted as simple age or 279 
time effects. This confirms our second research question that daily flight practice has a stronger 280 
influence on manual flight proficiency than the time dated back to flight school. 281 
DISCUSSION 282 
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General Findings According to Fine-Motor Flying Skills 283 
With the comparison of flight performance of pilots on long-haul versus short-haul fleets, this study 284 
offers a quasi-experimental approach to the analysis of practice and training effects on the level of 285 
manual flying skills. The reported results clearly confirm that the level of practice and training as 286 
measured by daily flying practice and elapsed time since initial flight training does have significant 287 
influences on fine-motor flying skills of airline pilots. In summary, we found the following rank order 288 
for fine-motor flight performance: CPT A320 > FO A320 > FO A340 > CPT A340. According to Table 1, 289 
the A320 CPTs had at least two advantageous factors: (1) they performed the highest number of 290 
landings in the past month, and (2) they had more flight hours on type compared to all other groups. 291 
The A320 FOs had an equal amount of practice in the past month but less total flying experience and 292 
less time on type. When looking at the long-haul data it seems that the total flight time and the time 293 
on type beyond 2,000 or 3,000 hours are less important factors for the level of manual skills than the 294 
daily practice and the time period since flight school. Therefore, the A340 FOs generally had more 295 
difficulties than the A320 FOs. Moreover, the A340 CPTs could not use their enormous flying 296 
experience as an advantage for the manual flying tasks. These senior long-haul pilots perform on 297 
average less than a quarter of the number of takeoffs and landings compared to short-haul pilots 298 
(Table 1). Hence, they have substantially less opportunity to practice their manual flying skills. If the 299 
level of skill is directly related to the amount of daily practice, long-haul pilots should show inferior 300 
performance in a manual flying task. Besides the type of operation (Fleet), another factor is 301 
suspected as being responsible for reduced manual flying skills: the pilot generation (called time 302 
since initial training in this study). According to the opinion of the European Aviation Safety Agency 303 
(2013, p1), senior pilots may be less comfortable with automation, while younger pilots may lack 304 
basic flying skills because they normally have less flying time on non-glass cockpit aircraft types. But 305 
then, the time interval since basic flight training and hence, the time for skill decay is shorter for 306 
younger pilots. Consequently as expected we found an interaction of the main effect for Fleet with 307 
the factor Rank.  308 
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A limiting factor of our previous research (Haslbeck et al., 2014) was that the different sources of 309 
variance (e.g. level of practice, flying experience, and type of aircraft) could not be separated 310 
because only A320 FOs had been compared to A340 CPTs. To reach a more conclusive comparison, 311 
we included two additional groups, A320 CPTs and A340 FOs, in this study. The findings concerning 312 
the importance of the amount of current practice for the level of manual flying skills can generally be 313 
confirmed. After all, in this study we identified additional factors that are related to time since initial 314 
training, age, and experience.  315 
All results in this study have clearly shown substantial influences of Fleet on all manual flight 316 
performance scores. Many long-haul pilots have demonstrated consistently larger deviations from 317 
the ideal ILS flightpath, which can be explained by the lower level of practice. While the mean RMSE 318 
deviations from the localizer tend to remain constant across the three altitude segments, the 319 
deviations from the glideslope increase sharply for the final segment – the transition from 320 
instrument to visual flying. The first order interaction effect (Altitude * Fleet) illustrates that the 321 
differences between the fleets become somewhat smaller when the aircraft approaches the ground, 322 
with the exception of the glideslope deviations during the visual segment. Long-haul crews flew 323 
higher above the glideslope, obviously aiming at a TD point wider into the runway. For the sake of 324 
completeness it must be said that Munich (EDDM) has 4,000 m long runways which significantly 325 
reduce the potential consequences of longer landings.     326 
As a second performance parameter, we analyzed the absolute distances of the TD points from the 327 
threshold and from the centerline, respectively. Again, a strong effect for the factor Fleet was found. 328 
Short-haul pilots landed closer to the centerline and about 400 m down the runway, while long-haul 329 
pilots performed longer landings (about 500 m beyond the threshold) with larger deviations from the 330 
centerline. The interaction Fleet * Rank is due to the lower performance of long-haul CPTs. 331 
The nature of effects for the between-subjects factor Rank is more complex because CPTs were on 332 
average 13 to 14 years older than the FOs. Additionally, CPTs have accumulated about 8,000 hours 333 
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more flight time, and the time since initial flight training was 12 to 13 years longer. Age, flight time, 334 
and time since flight school are highly correlated. In order to neutralize these confounding variables 335 
we executed MANCOVAs with time since initial training as a covariate. In these analyses all between-336 
subjects effects of Rank were insignificant, while Fleet still explained 31 % of the variance for the ILS 337 
deviation measures and 8 % of the variance for the TD points. Obviously, the level of practice 338 
measured by the number of executed landings per month contributed significantly to the decrement 339 
of manual flying skills in both CPTs and FOs of the long-haul fleet. This effect remained significant 340 
regardless of age or other time-related factors. The first-order interaction effects Fleet * Rank 341 
explained further variance in the analyses of ILS deviations and of the TD points. While CPTs showed 342 
better performance than FOs on the short-haul fleet, the long-haul FOs performed slightly better 343 
than the long-haul CPTs.  344 
Besides the significance of current practice for fine-motor flying performance, our findings do not 345 
confirm recent concerns about a general lack of basic flying skills among the younger generation of 346 
pilots (European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013; Civil Aviation Authority, 2014). As the youngest group, 347 
the A320 FOs with an average age of 30 and a little less than six years of airline experience 348 
performed second best on the manual ILS and landing. At this stage of their career, they clearly had 349 
sufficient opportunity in practice and training to develop the necessary level of flying skills. In 350 
summary, pilots with little recurrent practice and extensive use of automation seem to be running 351 
the risk of losing Langenwiesche’s (1944) touch and  feel of how to fly an aircraft. Especially, when 352 
considering Figure 3 the concern arises, what happens to pilots with even higher automated aircraft 353 
and longer working lifetime possibly spending on long-haul operation?                                                                                           354 
Limitations 355 
Our analysis was carried out with pilots from one airline only. Findings could be different in other 356 
airlines with other training schemes and other pilot career models for their flight crews. We are also 357 
aware that manual flying skills in fact cover more tasks than a manual ILS approach with a precise 358 
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landing within the touch-down zone. However, our aim was to complement existing research with 359 
objective performance data. By using scale deflections as the unit of accuracy we assured that 360 
flightpath deviations are not weighed disproportionally against distance to touchdown.  361 
One latent confound in this study deals with the different aircraft types. Both aircraft types are 362 
equipped with a fly-by-wire flight control system which has been designed to provide the same flying 363 
and handling qualities and to maintain the highest applicable extent of commonality (Brière & 364 
Traverse, 1993; Favre, 1994; Joint Aviation Authorities, 2004; Bissonnette & Culet, 2013) providing a 365 
similar look and feel for the pilot. Nevertheless, differences in the dynamics between both types 366 
exist. However, the question is not whether both types can be controlled identically, but whether 367 
both types can be controlled identically precise when sufficient pilot training accounting for specific 368 
peculiarities of each type has been completed. This second question can be confirmed by the fact 369 
that runways, precision approaches, and certification standards for these types as well as licensing 370 
standards for the pilots are the same. According to the manufacturers homepage “a large majority of 371 
pilots praising the handling qualities of Airbus aircraft and their commonality across the complete 372 
range of products” (Airbus, 2016). Additional evidence for the commonality of the two aircraft types 373 
with respect to achievable precision in manual control  comes from several A340 pilots in our sample 374 
who performed nearly on the same high level as the A320 crews did (Figure 1-3). However, none of 375 
the A340 pilots had that high level of daily flight practice as the A320 pilots did. 376 
Recommendations 377 
Until fail-proof automation outperforms human performance in all situations, the pilots remain the 378 
last line of defense in the cockpit. Under the described circumstances these pilots need even 379 
stronger manual flying skills as proposed by Langewiesche (1944) in the earlier days of aviation. 380 
Based on our findings we suggest a number of organizational and design recommendations for how 381 
to prevent a significant deterioration of manual flying skills. First of all, our findings indicate that the 382 
recent amount of regular simulator training is not sufficient to maintain manual flying skills of long-383 
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haul crews. Pilots with part-time schedules or reduced flight duties, like management pilots and 384 
pilots on parental leave, need special attention even when operating on short-haul service. Specific 385 
flight simulator training with a focus on manual flying tasks is one possible intervention. Mixed-fleet 386 
flying could be another powerful approach to increase a pilot’s practice if negative transfer effects 387 
can be kept under control (Lyall & Wickens, 2005). In this case pilots would perform short-haul and 388 
long-haul flights with type ratings for both types of aircraft in an alternating scheme. Another 389 
measure could be the operation of highly frequented short-haul connections with long-haul aircraft, 390 
like several flights within Japan. More manual flight practice could also be derived by changing 391 
companies’ automation policies to encourage pilots to fly manually if the situation permits (Federal 392 
Aviation Administration, 2013b; European Aviation Safety Agency, 2013). Such interventions have to 393 
be applied in the earlier stages of a pilot’s career before degradation can take place. Otherwise, 394 
avoidance behaviors and a feeling of discomfort according to manual flying could lead into a negative 395 
spiral of permanently less manual flight conduction. From a design perspective, intelligent 396 
(Geiselman, Johnson, & Buck, 2013) or adaptive automation (Parasuraman, 2000) could charge a 397 
pilot with several tasks to maintain his attention and situation awareness, thus keeping the pilot in 398 
the loop. Short-term effects can be avoiding automation surprises, which can lead to severe 399 
accidents, while a long-term effect can be the preservation of skills. However, all recommendations 400 
have to be considered for potential tradeoffs at the expense of safety by possible undesired side 401 
effects. 402 
KEY POINTS 403 
• Commercial airline pilots showed different levels of practice and training according to their 404 
scheduled type of operation, short-haul or long-haul. 405 
• Fleet (distinction between short-haul and long-haul) showed large significant effects on all 406 
analyzed manual flight performance indicators.  407 
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• Rank (distinction between captain and first officer) only showed little effects on manual flight 408 
performance. 409 
• All results supported the conclusion that recent flight practice is a significantly stronger 410 
predictor for manual flying performance than the time period since flight school or even the 411 
total or type-specific flight experience.    412 
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Figure 7: Distribution of participants’ age 527 
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